

Many Labs 2

Investigating Variation in Replicability
across Sample and Setting

Richard Klein

LIP/PC2S

Université Grenoble Alpes

2018-12-12 (updated: 2018-12-12)

Many Labs 2

Replication Crisis

Replication Crisis

From cause for concern...

Replication Crisis

From cause for concern...

Open access, freely

Essay

Why Most Published Research Findings Are False

John P.A. Ioannidis

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2011, Vol. 100, No. 3, 407–425

© 2011 American Psychological Association
0022-3514/11/\$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0021524

Feeling the Future: Experimental Evidence for Anomalous Retroactive Influences on Cognition and Affect

Daryl J. Bem
Cornell University

False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Significant

Joseph P. Simmons¹, Leif D. Nelson², and Uri Simonsohn¹

¹The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, and ²Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

Replication Crisis

...to evidence of a problem...

- [redacted] (OSC, 2015)
 - ~40/100 studies replicated
- [redacted] (Camerer et al., 2018)
 - 13/21 replicated
- [redacted]

Replication Crisis

...to addressing the problem

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- What we don't know:
 - Very much about replication.
 - Must improve understanding to inform solutions


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
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
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
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
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
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- Also: [Redacted] (IJzerman et al.), [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted], [Redacted]



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- Replicated 28 studies
 - Selected for impact, diversity of content, possibility for variation
 - Split across two study "packages" due to length
 - Computerized in Qualtrics
 - Randomized study order, presented back-to-back

Many Labs 2 Hsee example



Coats range from \$100-\$1000

Your friend buys you a \$110 coat



Scarves range from \$10-\$100

Your friend buys you a \$90 scarf

How generous was your friend?

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- Administer identical study package across as many diverse samples as possible

Many Labs 1 Map




Many Labs 2 Map



Many Labs 2

- 125 samples (each study administered in 60+)
- 36 countries, translated into 16 languages
- 15,305 participants total

Available at: osf.io/8cd4r



Many Labs 2 Results


Many Labs 2 Results

- 14/28 successful replications
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 - $p < .0001$, non-trivial effect size, same direction as original
 - One additional weakly supported: $p = .03$
- 21/28 had smaller effect size than original
 - Median original $d = 0.60$
 - Median replication $d = 0.15$

Many Labs 2 Heterogeneity



Many Labs 2 Heterogeneity



- Q statistic: 11/28 had $p < .001$ (statistically significant heterogeneity)
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- Q statistic: 11/28 had $p < .001$ (statistically significant heterogeneity)
 - For 11 studies, observed variability across sites exceeded that which would be expected due to chance.
- However: 26/28 $\text{Tau} \leq 0.1$
 - Variability across sites existed, but only had a very small effect (except for 1 or 2 studies)

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 - Instead, test moderators empirically
- Replication rate aligns with other projects
 - Is this meaningful?
- Many studies replicate robustly (and robust replicability is a feasible goal)
 - Reinforces need for solutions to ensure replicability
- Open data: <https://osf.io/8cd4r/>
 - CC0, free use (any purpose)
 - We barely scratched surface

Thanks!

Special thanks to co-leads Fred Hasselman, Michelangelo Vianello, and Brian Nosek + 186 other co-authors.

Questions/comments?

@raklein3


raklein22@gmail.com

<https://www.raklein.me>



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Does the 95% CI of the Effect Size at This Position Contain the Aggregate Effect Size? ● No ● Yes



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


Table 3. Results of Heterogeneity Tests for Each of the 28 Effects

Effect	ES ^a	All samples (no moderators)					Cohen's <i>q</i> effect size 3.00% [0%, 30%]
		Tau	<i>Q</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>I</i> ²	
Disgust sensitivity predicts homophobia (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009)	0.05	.00	55.80	58.00	.56	3.00%	[0%, 30%]
Assimilation and contrast effects in question sequences (Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991)	-0.07	.10	60.39	58.00	.39	15.00%	[0%, 33%]
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Correspondence bias (Miyamoto & Kitayama, 2002)	1.82	.00	235.65	57.00	< .001	65.00%	[46%, 73%]
Perceived intentionality for side effects (Knobe, 2003)	1.75	.14	631.72	58.00	< .001	93.00%	[92%, 97%]
Trolley Dilemma 1: principle of double effect (Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007)	1.35	.10	131.24	58.00	< .001	54.00%	[32%, 66%]
False Consensus: supermarket scenario (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977)	1.18	.00	65.54	58.00	.23	16.00%	[0%, 41%]
Moral typecasting (Gray & Wegner, 2009)	0.95	.10	203.30	59.00	< .001	73.00%	[62%, 83%]
False Consensus: traffic-ticket scenario (Ross et al., 1977)	0.95	.00	100.19	57.00	< .001	43.00%	[18%, 62%]
Preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002)	0.86	.10	156.75	56.00	< .001	66.00%	[54%, 81%]
Less is better (Hsee, 1998)	0.78	.10	158.41	56.00	< .001	65.00%	[49%, 77%]
Effect of framing on decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981)	0.40	.00	55.20	54.00	.43	6.00%	[0%, 36%]
Cardinal direction and socioeconomic status (Huang, Tse, & Cho, 2014)	0.40	.24	626.26	63.00	< .001	89.00%	[84%, 92%]
Moral foundations of liberals versus conservatives (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009)	0.29	.09	175.26	59.00	< .001	64.00%	[49%, 75%]
Reluctance to tempt fate (Risen & Gilovich, 2008)	0.18	.00	87.82	58.00	.01	36.00%	[6%, 54%]

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Trolley Dilemma 2: principle of double effect (Hauser et al., 2007)	0.25	.00	60.40	59.00	.42	12.00%	[0%, 33%]
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Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)	0.04	.00	64.88	58.00	.25	6.00%	[0%, 43%]
Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03	.00	103.56	53.00	< .001	50.00%	[28%, 68%]
Moral violations and desire for cleaning (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	.00	65.59	51.00	.08	22.00%	[0%, 52%]
Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03	.00	62.87	58.00	.31	3.00%	[0%, 42%]
Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978)	0.01	.00	15.33	48.00	.99	0.00%	[0%, 0%]
Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)	-0.04	.00	55.09	58.00	.58	2.00%	[0%, 30%]
Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	.10	72.96	46.00	.01	37.00%	[8%, 63%]
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)	-0.02	.00	33.95	51.00	.97	0.00%	[0%, 2%]
Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)	-0.03	.00	59.46	65.00	.67	0.00%	[0%, 27%]
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)	-0.13	.00	51.67	40.00	.10	26.00%	[0%, 52%]
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)	-0.08	.00	50.75	59.00	.77	0.00%	[0%, 21%]
Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18	.00	155.49	56.00	< .001	64.00%	[47%, 76%]

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Influence of incidental anchors on judgment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008)	0.04	.00	64.88	58.00	.25	6.00% [0%, 43%]
Social value orientation and family size (Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997)	-0.03	.00	103.56	53.00	< .001	50.00% [28%, 68%]
Moral violations and desire for cleaning (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006)	0.00	.00	65.59	51.00	.08	22.00% [0%, 52%]
Vertical position and power (Giessner & Schubert, 2007)	0.03	.00	62.87	58.00	.31	3.00% [0%, 42%]
Directionality and similarity (Tversky & Gati, 1978)	0.01	.00	15.33	48.00	.99	0.00% [0%, 0%]
Sociometric status and well-being (Anderson, Kraus, Galinsky, & Keltner, 2012)	-0.04	.00	55.09	58.00	.58	2.00% [0%, 30%]
Priming "heat" increases belief in global warming (Zaval, Keenan, Johnson, & Weber, 2014)	-0.03	.10	72.96	46.00	.01	37.00% [8%, 63%]
Structure promotes goal pursuit (Kay, Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Landau, 2014)	-0.02	.00	33.95	51.00	.97	0.00% [0%, 2%]
Disfluency engages analytic processing (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007)	-0.03	.00	59.46	65.00	.67	0.00% [0%, 27%]
Effect of choosing versus rejecting on relative desirability (Shafir, 1993)	-0.13	.00	51.67	40.00	.10	26.00% [0%, 52%]
Affect and risk (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001)	-0.08	.00	50.75	59.00	.77	0.00% [0%, 21%]
Construing actions as choices (Savani, Markus, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2010)	-0.18	.00	155.49	56.00	< .001	64.00% [47%, 76%]